assumed a larger role in fixing the monetary regime and began to pressure the Federal Reserve to pursue the Administration's policy objectives.'
The concentration of power within the Board of Governors, and the increased monetary policy role assumed by the Administration, reflected a common view that the decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve System and the private-sector role in policymaking was flawed.
Marriner Eccles, whom President Roosevelt selected to head the Fed's Board of Governors, advocated the setting of monetary policy by public officials located in Washington whose allegiance was solely to the national interest (Eccles 1966, pp. 170-72) .
More recent appraisals of Federal Reserve monetary policy during the Great Depression
have similarly attributed at least some of the Fed's failures to the System's decentralized structure. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , for example, argue that policy deteriorated when the Federal Reserve Banks outside of New York were given an increased policymaking role in 1930.
This, according to Friedman and Schwartz, increased the authority of Reserve Bank officials who lacked experience, had parochial views of policy, were jealous of New York's size and power, and were inclined to oppose any policies advocated by officials of the New York Bank. Eichengreen (1992) also blames the Fed's contractionary monetary policy during the Great Depression on the System's decentralized structure. But, instead of emphasizing personalities, Eichengreen argues that competition between the Reserve Banks for gold reserves caused policy to be less responsive to the Great Depression than it would have been had the Reserve Banks cooperated or if absolute authority for policy had been held by a governing board.
Eichengreen cites this failure of decentralization as a "cautionary tale" for Europe, warning that central bank pursuit of national objectives could prove destabilizing during the transition to a In this paper I will argue that decentralization of authority per se was not primarily responsible for the Fed's disastrous monetary policy during the Great Depression or for later mistakes. Parochialism and competition among the Reserve Banks played a role, but these were neither the principal cause of the Fed's mistakes nor were they uncorrectable -indeed the Banking Act of 1935 largely eliminated the ability of individual Reserve Banks to pursue independent objectives. Instead, I argue, the Fed's policy blunders during the Depression were caused primarily by the System's allegiance to the gold standard and the use of flawed theories and operating procedures. Neither cause stemmed from the Fed's structure or changes to it.
Indeed, the rise of inflation in the 1960s and 1970s occurred despite increased centralization of monetary policy authority, and largely was a result of the Fed using the same flawed approach it had employed during the Depression. One lesson of the Federal Reserve experience is that mistakes can occur regardless of a central bank's organizational form.
I claim also that the decentralized organization of the Federal Reserve System offers a number of advantages that enhance the quality of policymaking. Specifically, the present organization of policy authority within the Federal Reserve System gives the Fed a measure of political independence without substantially lessening the System's accountability. And, at the same time that the participation of Reserve Bank presidents in formulating policy provides political independence from without, it also grants a measure of intellectual independence from within. The principal benefit of the participation of Reserve Bank presidents in monetary policymaking is commonly thought to be the collection and analysis of regional economic information. However, by fostering independent economic research within the System, the Fed's decentralized structure also promotes a competition of ideas and critical analysis of policy which gets a hearing through the membership of Reserve Bank presidents on the FOMC. This, I argue, is the main benefit of the Fed's regional system, and it suggests that some degree of decentralization is desirable. The Federal Reserve System was designed as an organization of quasi-autonomous regional bankers' banks. By the early 20 th century, regional credit markets in the United States had become highly integrated (see James 1978) . Still, the Fed's founders believed that enough disparities in credit conditions and needs remained to warrant the establishment of regional Reserve Banks, each with its own locally-set discount rate.
In making explicit that the Federal Reserve was not a "central bank," Congress also reflected America's long-standing aversion to concentration of financial power. Congress sought particularly to limit the power of private New York City financial interests. But, at the same time, there was little support for establishing a public central bank headquartered in Washington D.C. The organization of twelve regional Reserve Banks, privately owned and operated, but with an overseeing government board, was thus a compromise. 3
For practical purposes, the Federal Reserve Act left the public side of the Fed -the Federal Reserve Board -weak. Its authority was not clearly defined, and its early members had neither stature nor leadership qualities. 4 The Federal Reserve Banks, especially the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, by contrast, held the balance of power. The Reserve Banks held the System's assets and dealt with the System's customers -member commercial banks (who also formally owned the Reserve Banks), the U.S. Treasury, and foreign central banks. The Reserve Banks also initiated the financial transactions that would later evolve into the primary means of implementing monetary policy.
The Federal Reserve Act required all federally chartered (i.e., "national") banks and any state-chartered banks that chose to join the Federal Reserve System to purchase stock in their
The FederalReserve Act specified only that between eight and twelve Reserve Banks were to be established, with their number and locations determined by an organizing committee.
In formal protocol, FederalReserve Board members ranked equal to assistant secretaries of cabinet departments (Wicker 1966, pp. 6-7) . Reserve Board, with the other six elected by the member banks. Originally, the Federal Reserve Act required that the chairman be a person of "tested banking experience." Three of the six directors elected by member banks could be bankers, while the other three were required to be "actively engaged in their district in commerce, agriculture or some other industrial pursuit." An amendment to the Federal Reserve Act in 1977 changed this provision to read that such directors were to be selected "with due but not exclusive consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor and consumers."
It also removed the provision that the board chairman be a person with banking experience. See Moore (1990, pp. 25-26) . 6 Before 1935, most relations with foreign central banks had been handled by the governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which had long irritated Federal Reserve Board members. By changing the titles of the chief executive officers of Federal Reserve Banks from "governor" to "president," titling all members of the Board of Governors as "governors," and stating explicitly that relations with foreign central required that no two members of the Board of Governors come from the same Federal Reserve district. 7
The Banking Act of 1935 retained a monetary policymaking role for the Federal Reserve Banks, both through membership of Reserve Bank presidents on the FOMC and in the setting of the discount rate. The FOMC consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the twelve Reserve Bank presidents. Collectively, however, the presidents have just five votes, which rotate among the Banks, except that the New York Bank president always has a vote and serves as FOMC vice chair.
The Federal Reserve Act authorizes each Reserve Bank to establish its own discount rate, subject to Board approval. The Fed's founders believed that to serve the needs of commercial activity throughout the country, it might be appropriate for the discount rate to vary from region to region. Although the Reserve Banks quickly discovered that they could not set their discount rates independently of one another, Reserve Bank discount rates were not always uniform across districts, especially in the System's early years. To this day, the Reserve Banks formally initiate changes in their discount rates, though the Board of Governors effectively determines the rate through its authority to ratify rates established by the Reserve Banks. Except for an occasional delay of a day or two, the rate is now uniform across districts. Still, Reserve Bank boards of directors sometimes request permission to change their discount rate as a signal to the Board of Governors of a desire to change monetary policy. This provision seems to have had little effect on the President's selection of Board members, as various nominees have been assigned to districts other than the ones in which they reside. exchange market intervention for the System as a whole, is responsible for supervising New York bank holding companies, and operates a major share of the payments system. At times, however, various members of the FOMC, including the New York Fed president, the chairman of the Board of Governors, and other members, have had more or less influence on policy than at other times. To a great extent, these ebbs and flows of power have reflected personalities, as well as economic conditions and the strength of arguments put forward by individual members. In short, the influence of the Federal Reserve Bank presidents cannot be understood simply by examining the Federal Reserve Act and its amendments.
Monetary Policymaking Before 1935
This section reviews the Fed's early history, focusing on the development of a national 
The Fed's Design
The Federal Reserve System was established to overcome faults in the banking and payments system that were thought to produce recurring financial crises and inefficiencies in making payments. There was no conception of monetary policy in the sense we think of it today.
The Fed was intended to operate within the context of the gold standard, and gold, not the Fed, was expected to determine the value of the dollar as it had done before the Fed's establishment.
While the gold standard would continue to serve as the long-run monetary anchor, the Fed was designed to provide short-run flexibility in the supplies of currency and bank credit.
Financial crises were widely viewed as the product of an "inelastic currency," i.e., a money supply that failed to expand or contract to accommodate variation in demand. 8 A means of rapidly supplying large amounts of currency was key to most reform proposals, mirroring private initiatives to create currency substitutes during banking panics. 9
The Federal Reserve System was created to provide a means by which currency and bank reserves could expand and contract automatically with changes in demand. Member banks hold deposits with Federal Reserve Banks to meet statutory reserve requirements as well as to provide final settlement for payments. To accommodate an increase in demand for credit or currency, a bank could re-discount short-term commercial loans with their Federal Reserve Bank, and thereby acquire either additional reserve deposits or Federal Reserve notes.' 0 By linking the extension of new reserves and currency to the re-discount of short-term commercial loans, the Fed's founders sought to ensure that the currency stock and bank reserves were sufficient to accommodate real economic activity without being inflationary."
In addition to extending currency and reserves through the discount window, the Federal Reserve Banks were authorized to engage in open-market purchases and sales of bankers acceptances and U.S. government securities. Reform proponents sought the development of an active market in bankers acceptances in the United States to compete with the London market, and so provided a means by which the resources of Federal Reserve Banks could be used to 8 In the so-called "National Banking Era," of 1863-1914, the nation's currency consisted of coin, silver certificates, notes issued by the federal government during the Civil War ("greenbacks"), and notes issued by federally-chartered banks, which were limited by the par value of government bonds banks held as collateral. The stock of currency was thus rather inflexible, whereas the demand for currency fluctuated widely over a seasonal cycle, with the business cycle, and whenever the solvency of commercial banks, and hence the value of bank deposits, was questioned.
The activities of clearinghouses are the most noteworthy. During panics, clearinghouses extended credit for clearing payments to member banks by issuing clearinghouse certificates collateralized by bank assets. In later panics, small-denomination certificates made their way into public use as currency substitutes. See Dewald (1972) , Gorton (1985) , and Timberlake (1984) for further discussion of clearinghouses.
0 Most commercial loans were made on a discount basis. Hence when the Fed purchased such loans from member banks, they were "re-discounted." " This self-regulating extension of currency and reserves to accommodate the needs of commerce later became known as the "real bills doctrine." On the reform proposals underlying the Federal Reserve Act, see Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 168-73) , Timberlake (1978, pp. 186-206) or West (1977) . provide a demand for acceptances. In authorizing the Reserve Banks to buy and sell government securities, the Fed's founders sought to provide the Banks with a source of revenue in case discount loans and acceptances failed to generate sufficient income for the System to cover its expenses and pay dividends to its stockholders, the member banks (Chandler 1958, p. 76 Lacking specific instructions, Reserve Bank officials initially followed orthodox principles in setting their discount rates. They determined that the discount rate should be a penalty rate, i.e., set above market rates, and that in fixing the rate, first priority must be preservation of the gold standard.
The ultimate check on the activities of a Reserve Bank was its gold reserve requirement.
Each Reserve Bank was required to maintain gold reserves equal to at least 40 percent of its note issue and to 35 percent of its deposit liabilities.' 2 It seemed well understood that, should a reserve deficiency threaten, the discount rate must be set at whatever level was necessary to restore adequate reserves. Normally, however, discount rates were expected to be penalty rates, and typically were so until the United States entered World War I.
i2 In addition, Reserve Banks were required to hold collateral in the form of commercial loans rediscounted for member banks equal to the amount of currency they issued.
World WarI and the Development ofMonetary Policy
With Reserve Bank discount rates set above market rates, there was little demand for largely by an increase in loans to member banks, 95 percent of which were collateralized by government securities (Chandler 1958, p. 118 ).
The Fed retained preferential discount rates on government securities after war's end to support continued Treasury funding. By late 1919, however, the Reserve Banks had become increasingly concerned about their falling reserve ratios, as well as continued high inflation, and collectively they began to press for higher interest rates and an end to preferential rates on loans backed by government securities. In November, the Banks proposed increases in their discount rates for the first time since early 1918. were not, and the Board chose to side with the Banks and approve an increase in rates (Chandler 1958, p. 152) .
In January 1920, however, the Federal Reserve Board followed the Treasury's recommendation in rejecting a request from the New York Fed to raise its discount rate again and to end the preferential rate on loans backed by Treasury certificates. At the Treasury's urging, the Board instead instructed the New York Fed to raise its rate to 6 percent on commercial paper- More discount rate increases followed the January hike, and by June 1920 the New York
Bank rate stood at 7 percent. Despite declining economic activity, deflation, and criticism of their policies, the Reserve Banks maintained their discount rates at 7 percent until April 1921. Fed officials apparently had two objectives in mind: 1) to restore Reserve Bank gold reserves to comfortable levels, and 2) to retire Federal Reserve credit that had been extended against government debt, which System officials viewed as inflationary. These objectives, of course, reflected the Fed's founding principles of preserving the gold standard and restricting the growth of Federal Reserve credit to the financing of short-term commercial loans, i.e., "real bills."
Wartime priorities had forced a retreat from these principles but they had not been abandoned. It was not long thereafter, however, that the development of new procedures brought a more activist policy strategy that called old guidelines into question.
'~As a member of Congress, Glass had co-authored the Federal Reserve Act and was known as the "father" of the Federal Reserve System.
Open-market Operations and Benjamin Strong's Monetary Policy
Chandler ( the New York Bank acting as their agent (Chandler 1958, p. 77 ).
The Reserve Banks, particularly New York, observed the influence that their purchases of securities had on market rates and credit conditions, as did the Treasury Department. The
Treasury complained to the Fed that its purchases made it difficult to price new issues and carry out other operations (Chandler 1958, pp. 209-210) . The Conference of Reserve Bank Governors responded by agreeing not to purchase more securities than were needed to cover Reserve Bank expenses and, more importantly, to inform the Treasury when they intended to enter the market. Under Strong's direction, the Fed made substantial purchases of government securities in 1924 and again in 1927. The motivation for these operations has been debated. In a recent book, Toma (1997) argues that, as before, the Fed was motivated by earnings, and government security purchases merely offset declining discount loans to hold the Fed's stock of earning assets constant. Chandler (1958) , Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , Meltzer (1997), and Wicker (1966) , however, all argue that Strong was motivated by a desire to influence money market conditions to achieve general policy objectives, but these authors disagree on what those general objectives were. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) contend that Strong sought to stabilize domestic economic activity and that open-market purchases in 1924 and 1927 were made to promote recovery from recessions (see also Fisher 1935, pp. 5 17-20) . Wicker (1966) and so open-market sales and discount rate increases were undertaken. In 1929, however, disagreement over how best to halt the flow of credit to the stock market without doing unnecessary damage to economic activity again divided the Board and Reserve Banks.
To quell stock market speculation, the Federal Reserve Board promoted a policy of "direct action" -essentially closing the discount window to banks that made stock market loans.
The Board attempted to enforce this policy by instructing the Reserve Banks to report on how they monitored the use of Federal Reserve credit supplied through the discount window and the methods the Banks employed to prevent improper use of their credit facilities.' 4 New York Fed officials had long argued that it was not possible to control the use of Federal Reserve credit, even by requiring that discount window loans be secured by short-term commercial loans. They argued that the Board's plan would not accomplish its objective, and could prove too draconian because banks would turn to other sources of funds or restrict credit to all customers. Other Reserve Banks reported that it was practically impossible to determine the cause of any specific borrowing request it received from a member bank, and that closing the window to banks that held security loans would force costly portfolio adjustments on member banks (see Chandler 1971, pp. 59-62) .
Instead of direct action, the Reserve Banks favored further discount rate hikes. The New York Fed's directors voted on February 14, 1929 to increase the Bank's discount rate from 5 to 6 percent, but this increase, and several other requests, were denied by the Federal Reserve Board.
'~' On "direct action," see Chandler (1971, pp. 54-70) , Meltzer (1997 ), or Wicker (1966 .
Only several months later was a compromise reached. Once again disagreement over policy generated controversy about where the balance of power lay within the System. 'T
he Great Depression
By almost any measure, the monetary policy of 1930 to 1933 was a disaster: the money supply and price level both fell by one-third, ex post real interest rates rose well into double digits, and banks failed by the thousands.
The most prominent explanation for the Fed's behavior during the Great Depression is that of Friedman and Schwartz (1963 Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 415-16) blame this "diffusion of power" for the Fed's mistakes during the Depression:
A committee of twelve men, each regarding himself as an equal of all the others and each the chiefadministrator of an institution established to strengthen regional independence, could much more easily agree on a policy of drift and inaction than on a coordinated policy involving the public assumption of responsibility for decisive and large-scale action. There is more than a little element of truth in the jocular description of a committee as a group of people, no one of whom knows what should be done, who Thus, a similar defense in the 1930s reflected a consistent policy. Brunner and Meltzer (1968) This seems counter to the evidence presented by Chandler (1958) , Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and other studies indicating that Fed officials sought macroeconomic stability. Eichengreen (1992) overall System open-market purchases during the Depression were less than they otherwise would have been, and insufficient to allay the economic collapse. Chandler (1971, pp. 186-90) concurs, arguing that the individual Reserve Banks were reluctant to "relinquish control over the size and composition of their earning assets" by agreeing to System purchases of government See also Brunner and Meltzer (1964; , Meltzer (1994) , and Wheelock (1991; Although they disagreed with Morgenthau' s conclusion that the increase in reserve requirements had caused the decline in bond prices, Fed officials met with Morgenthau and reassured him of 20 The large, money center banks in New York City and Chicago were designated as "central reserve city" banks; Federal Reserve member banks in other designated large cities were classified as "reserve city" banks, and Fed member banks located elsewhere were classified as "country" banks. These designations were held over from the National Banking era, when the level and form of required reserves for national banks depended on a bank's location. The central reserve city and reserve city distinctions were dropped in 1962 and 1972, respectively. their desire to maintain "orderly" markets for government securities (FOMC Minutes, March 13, 1937 (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, pp. 370-83, 692-93) . By the mid-to late-'30s, The FOMC thus adopted a "bills only" policy in early 1953 (though open-market operations remained under the supervision of the New York Bank). Sproul vehemently opposed the bills only policy, arguing that there might be times when the Fed could provide market stability by operating in longer maturity securities. He argued also that the Fed's influence on the economy lay not just in supplying bank reserves, but that the Fed could affect saving and 22 Curkierman (1982, pp. 393-4) argues that the quality of a central bank's research department is a "potentially importantcomponent" of the bank's independence: "A governor who is backed by an absolutely and relatively strong research department carries more weight vis-à-vis the Treasury and other branches of government." investment by influencing (or, as Sproul said, "nudging") the yields of securities of different maturities.
Sproul forced a reconsideration of the bills only policy at a meeting of the FOMC on June 11, 1953, when just four members of the Board of Governors were present. Sproul's resolution to rescind the bills only policy carried by a vote of five to four, with the five voting Reserve Bank presidents supporting the resolution. At the next FOMC meeting, however, the bills only policy was reinstated by a vote of nine to two, with only Sproul and one other president voting against.
According to Clifford (1965, pp. 288-89) , apart from disagreement about the transmission of monetary policy to the economy, the majority's support for bills only stemmed from a desire to avoid any appearance of pegging yields, which might give the appearance of excessive Treasury influence, and a fear that operating in securities of all maturities would give the New York Bank too much control of System policy.
Monetary Aggregate Targeting
The debate over "bills only" is the most discussed controversy within the Fed during the i9SOs. By the end of that decade, however, a more fundamental debate arose about how to implement monetary policy in the face of inflation, an increasing international payments deficit and variability in real economic activity.
The concerns of Federal Reserve officials that excessively rapid growth of bank reserves and monetary aggregates were causing inflation led to the Fed's rebellion against the Treasury and, ultimately, the Accord of 1951. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 628) refer to the Fed's new emphasis on money supply growth as a "near-revolutionary" change in policy. Similarly, Ahearn (1963) cites Federal Reserve statements that "It is the function of reserve banking, by regulating the volume of bank reserves, to counteract the tendency for excessive swings in the volume of money," and that "The primary responsibility of the Federal Reserve System is to determine the volume of member bank reserves.... By regulating the volume of member bank reserves, the Federal Reserve thus exerts a dominant influence on the size of the money supply." 23
Despite these pronouncements, the Fed did not explicitly target monetary aggregates in the 1950s. Instead, the Fed reverted to its strategy of the 1920s and early 1930s in which openmarket operations were used to manipulate commercial bank free reserves (i.e., excess less borrowed reserves) to achieve specific money market objectives (see, e.g., Brunner and Meltzer 1964; Calomiris and Wheelock 1998) . When the Fed sought to tighten policy, it attempted to "firm" money market conditions by draining free reserves from the banking system. The extent to which interest rates increased informed the Fed as to how much tighter policy had become.
Similarly, to ease policy, the Fed added to free reserves and judged monetary conditions by the extent to which interest rates declined. Importantly, however, money supply objectives did enter the free reserve projections made by Fed staff and, according to Wicker (1974, p. 173) , "by controlling the reserve injection mechanism, the Federal Open Market Committee attempted to exert control over money market conditions and the annual growth of Ml." The Fed could not, of course, simultaneously control both money market conditions and money supply growth, and when conflicts between these objectives arose, the Fed always gave preference to the money market over the money supply.
By the late 'SOs, however, the Fed's emphasis on free reserves and the money market was under attack from two Reserve Bank presidents who favored setting quantitative targets for total reserve and money stock growth. Malcolm Bryan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, was perhaps the first and most sophisticated proponent of monetary aggregate targeting among FOMC members in the late 'SOs and early 1960s (Hafer 1997 free reserves (Figure 1 ). Money supply growth increased, however, and inflation continued to rise (Figure 2) .25
The accelerations of money supply growth and inflation while free reserves were declining was further evidence that the level of free reserves does not accurately reflect the stance of monetary policy. This point was not lost on Federal Reserve officials. Fed governor Sherman
Maisel, for example, asserted the following at a FOMC meeting in May 1966:
When members looked at total reserves or nonborrowed reserves, either of which he took to be the principal measures of the committee's actions, they must be appalled at the committee's results.... In the five months since December 1 [19651, the committee had poured more reserves into the banking system than were furnished in the entire year.... The results did not accord with the committee's intent, its statements or sound policy.... The committee apparently had followed sub-goals such as feel of the market, net [free] reserves, or the need to offset shocks, and as a result it had moved in a direction opposite to its real aim. (FOMC Minutes, May 10, 1966, pp. 62-63) Maisel strongly advocated setting policy in terms of a monetary target, and in 1968 he persuaded Inflation was finally brought under control only when the Fed, under Paul Volker, elected to allow wider swings in interest rates so as to check money supply growth (Figures 3 and 4) .
Although the Fed in 1979 adopted a policy stance that had long been advocated by the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and others within the System, the abrupt tightening of monetary policy in 1979 did not necessarily mean that the Fed had adopted monetarism. While interest rates were permitted to vary more widely than they had before, money supply growth also became more variable.
26 As the 1980s progressed, the velocity of money became less stable and the Fed deemphasized money supply growth in formulating its policies. By the 1990s, the Fed had abandoned money supply growth altogether in favor of fixing a target for the federal funds rate to achieve its policy objectives. Although policy now appears oriented primarily toward achieving price level stability (see, e.g., Greenspan 1998), the Fed has not formally adopted a price level target, despite the advocacy by some Federal Reserve Bank presidents that the System do so. 26 Using previously unreleased documents, Gilbert (1994) finds that the Fed's commitment to short-run control of money stock growth varied over the period 1979-82. See also Poole (1982) Andersen and Jordan (1968) .
The "St. Louis Equation" was a simple econometric test of the relative impact of monetary and fiscal policy on the growth of nominal gross national product. The evidence in Andersen and Jordan (1968) , and extended by Keran (1969) and others, indicated that money stock growth was a far more important determinant of nominal GNP than fiscal policy, and thus suggested that monetary policy -specifically the control of a monetary aggregate -was potentially a more useful tool than fiscal policy for stabilization policy. Andersen and Carlson (1970) Other FOMC members expressed similar views. Governor Mitchell, for example, argued that "the Federal Reserve was doing itself a disservice by simultaneously publicizing such disparate descriptions of 'recent' rates of growth in money." And, "it was his personal view that the approach being followed by the St. Louis Reserve Bank was creating the mistaken impression that the system had not been doing a good job in making monetary policy" (FOMC Minutes, June 23, 1970, p. 26) . Chairman Arthur Burns added that "it should be possible for the Federal
Reserve to avoid excessive variety in the measurement methods it employed," and proposed forming a staff committee to examine the problem (FOMC Minutes, June 23, 1970, p. 27) .
Perhaps the strongest criticism came from Governor Brimmer, who argued that "the problem went beyond that of differences in methods of measuring changes in the money supply.
The St. Louis Bank now employed an approach to analysis that was competitive with that used elsewhere in the System; some day there might be thirteen different analytical approaches in the system, with the Board and each Bank going its own way. While he would not favor censorship, he thought the staff committee should be asked to consider questions of analysis as well as of measurement" (FOMC Minutes, June 23, 1970, pp. 27-28 Reserve Banks could interfere with the implementation of policies decided by the majority.
for substantial changes to articles before publication and sometimes against publication altogether. To my knowledge, however, all publication decisions have ultimately been left to the Reserve Banks.
Fortunately, I believe, the Banking Act of 1935 eliminated this possibility while retaining the advantages of a decentralized system. This reduces the likelihood that Reserve Banks will be pressured effectively by politicians to represent local interests. In Europe, the national central banks may face greater pressure to represent national interests in monetary policy deliberations for Europe as a whole. Second, in the United States, political union and a high degree of regional economic integration, which existed even in 1914, limit the extent to which economic interests and policy preferences differ across regions. The extent of economic and political integration is less in the European Union, which would seem to increase the likelihood of interregional conflicts and, hence, pressures on EU monetary policy.
In short, a decentralized structure has probably hampered monetary policy less over the life of the Federal Reserve than one might expect it will in Europe because the Fed was established in an environment in which economic and political union had existed for over 100 years. Regional conflicts seem more likely to disrupt policy in the European System of Central Banks than it ever has in the Federal Reserve System. The remaining question, then, is whether such conflict will lead to greater concentration of decision making authority at the center or, instead, irreparable strain on the monetary union.
